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 ABSTRACT:  This paper analyzes a rent seeking competition where risk neutral 
agents have a different income. The individual income is private information but the income 
distribution is common information. Like the Hillman and Samet (1987) model the individual 
outlays in rent seeking is equal to the expected rent, but the winning probability for each agent 
is a function of its income. As a consequence, the social costs of the rent seeking depend on the 
income distribution and they can be lesser than the traditional measure pointed out by Hillman 
and Samet (1987). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
  The literature on the rent seeking (Posner 1975; Tullock 1980; Hillman and 
Katz, 1984) is very extensive. Particular attention is posed on the social costs of the 
rent seeking activities that is on the amount of resources spent for unproductive 
lobbying activities and thus subtracted from productive activities. In technical 
language, when the total amount of invested resources is equal to the value of the rent, 
a total dissipation occurs with no added value for the economic system. 
  As the literature points out, the phenomenon verifies in different 
circumstances: regulation process (Stigler, 1971), patent competition in the R&D, job 
promotion within organizations (Milgrom and Roberts, 1993), application of quotas 
and of favourable legislation in agricultural sector (Bachev, 2009), auctions (Baye et 
al., 1996; Amann and Leininger, 1996; Che and Gale, 1998). 
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  Following Hillman and Samet (1987), we analyze a rent seeking competition 
between two risk neutral agents. The rent seekers agents are asymmetric because they 
have different income and the rent seeking competition is structured as a first price 
auction. In this framework the paper shows that the social costs of the rent seeking 
crucially depend on the income distribution.  
  The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is a review of the literature, 
sections 3 and 3.1 describe the rent seeking competition and the expenditure functions 
of the agents. The maximization problem of the agents is analyzed in section 4 while 
the social costs of the rent seeking are calculated in section 5. Finally, Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
 
  Public choice literature on rent seeking is very extensive. Different models are 
based on different hypotheses. Some models consider risk neutral rent seekers agents 
competing for an exogenous rent X (Posner 1975; Tullock 1980 a); 1980 b); 1980 c); 
1989), while others models analyze the rent seeking competition with risk averse rent 
seekers agents (Hillman and Katz 1984). 
  Unlike the Posner’s model where there is a total dissipation of the rent, Tullock 
highlights a different result. In his model the probability of each agent to obtain the 
rent is not a linear function of investments in rent seeking activities, but it depends on a 
parameter (r) representing the “effectiveness” of the rent seeking expenditures. 
  Therefore, in this setting the value of r (equal for all agents) and the number of 
the agents are crucial to determine the amount of resources invested in lobbying 
activities and representing the “social costs of the rent seeking”. When the total amount 
of individual expenditures in rent seeking is equal to the value of the rent for which the 
agents compete, a total dissipation of the rent occurs. Extending the Tullock’s model, 
Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005) show that, introducing an exit option for risk neutral 
rent seeker agents, valuable rents may remain unexploited
1. These lost rents represent 
an additional social cost of the rent seeking. 
  The case of risk adverse agents is considered by Hillman and Katz (1984). In 
their paper the social cost of the rent seeking is lower than the risk neutrality case if the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion is decreasing. 
  Another class of models (Krueger 1974; Appelbaum and Katz 1987; Fabella 
1996) considers the rent endogenously determined by the rent seeking competition and 
analyzes the behavior of the rent seekers to obtain this rent. On the contrary, 
Appelbaum and Katz (1987) present an analysis of the interaction of a regulator and 
the rent seeker firms and they show that the outcome (the value of the rent and the rent 
seeking expenditures) depends on the relative bargaining powers of the regulator and 
the firms.  
  In any case, all these models are based on the crucial assumption that the 
agents are identical: they have the same utility function, the same income and solve the 
same maximization problem. Therefore, the equilibria of the rent seeking competition 
 
1 See also J. Munster (2007).  
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are necessarily symmetrical and the social cost of the rent seeking is the product 
between the individual expenditure in lobbying activities and the number of the agents.      
A different perspective appears if asymmetrical agents are considered (Rogerson 1982; 
Leininger 1993; Kohli and Singh 1999). 
  In particular, Kohli and Singh (1999) generalize the models of Tullock (1980) 
and of Appelbaum and Katz (1987). Unlike Appelbaum and Katz (1987), they 
introduce an asymmetry among the agents rent seekers captured by a parameter 
representing the different effectiveness of the lobbying outlays influencing the winning 
probability (i.e. the probability to obtain the rent). Therefore, even if the agents invest 
the same amount of resources, they can produce a different level of “influence” 
towards the decision maker and so, a different probability to obtain the rent. In this 
sense, they generalize the Tullock’s model (1980) considering agents characterized by 
a different parameter of effectiveness “r”. 
  Other extensions (Leininger (1992) consider an interaction à la Stackelberg 
between rent seeker firms. In this case, the outcome of the rent seeking game depends 
on the asymmetries in effectiveness and on timing of the moves. 
  Finally, recently the auction theory focuses on game theory methodology to 
model rent seeking competition. In particular, the “all pay” first price models are 
linked to the rent seeking framework because, unlike a standard auction where active 
participation constitutes only a conditional commitment, in a “all pay” first price 
auction active participation constitutes an unconditional commitment (even the losers 
pay).  
  In this class of models (Baye et al., 1996; Amann and Leininger, 1996) the 
asymmetry among competitive agents is related to the subjective valuation of the bid’s 
object.  
 
3. THE RENT SEEKING COMPETITION 
 
  We consider two agents risk neutral. At the same time they compete for a rent 
X
2  investing some resources in rent seeking outlays. The assignment mechanism is 
like a first price auction: the agent with a greater bid obtains the rent, but all competing 
agents bear sunk costs. 
  The agents are not identical because they have a different income, respectively 
W1 and W2. The individual level of income identifies the type of the agent and it is a 
continuous random variable on [0;W ]. Therefore, [0;W ] is the set of the possible 
types. Each agent only knows his /her type (his/her income). So, the agent’s type is a 
private information, but the density function, p(w), of the variable W and its 
cumulative distribution, P(W), are common information. The standard assumptions on 
cumulative distribution are satisfied so that: P(0)=0 and P(W )=1. W1 and W2 are 
independent events. 
                                                 
2 The analysis is restricted to the short run, since other agents can not enter to compete for this rent.  
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  In this framework, we consider the rent seeking outlays as a function of the 
income
3. The following section clarifies this point. 
 
3.1. The expenditure functions 
 
  Each agent’s expenditure in rent seeking is a continuous increasing function of 
the income: si= f(Wi) with f '>0 and i= 1,2                                                                   
  The asymmetry between the agents is represented only by the different 
individual income. They solve the same maximization problem, have the same risk 
attitude, the same functional form of the function f(.)
4.  
Since Wi  is  a  random  variable,  a  distribution  of  probability  is  induced  on                         
si ∈[0;  s =f(W )]. In order to obtain the density function of si , a transformation of 
random variable is needed. 
  Let G(s) be the probability that the expenditure si =f(Wi) is lower than a given 
s: 
G(s)=prob{f(Wi ) < s}=prob {Wi < f
-1(s)} = 
            =  = P[f ∫
− (s) 1 f
0 i i)dW p(W
-1(s)] - P(0) = P[f
-1(s)]          (1) 
 
The density function g(s) is
5: g(s)=  p(f
-1(s))⋅ 
ds
(s) df
1 −
 = p(f
-1(s))⋅    ) (s) (f
1 ′
−
 
  Given the assignment mechanism of the rent, the agent 1 obtains the rent if 
his/her outlay in rent seeking (s1 =f(W1)) is greater than the opponent’s outlay (s2=f(W2 
)). In other words, the winning probability of the agent 1 is the probability that his/her 
income is greater than the opponent’s income 
6: 
 
prob{s2 < s1 }= prob{f(W2 )< s1}= prob{W2< f
-1 (s1)} = 
           =∫ = P[ f
− ) 1 (s 1 f
0 2 2)dW p(W
-1(s1)] 
7             (2)                
 
The losing probability for the agent 1 is {1 - P[ f
-1(s1)]}. 
 
4. THE MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM OF THE AGENTS 
 
                                                 
3In most of the models of rent seeking,the rent seeking expenditures depend on the value of the rent 
(Tullock ‘67; Krueger ‘74; Posner ‘75; Tullock ‘80). 
4 In the contrary case, it is obvious that a more risk adverse agent invests less than the other agent.   
5 It is the first derivative with respect to s of the cumulative distribution  G(s). Since G(s) is a composite 
function of s, the first derivative is obtained applying the chain rule. 
6Because the expenditure functions are increasing in income. 
7 Since f
-1(s1) =W1 , P[f
-1(s1)]= P(W1).Nevertheless the transformation of random variable is needed 
because even if the new  random variable s(.)  has the same probability order of w  (because it is a 
monotone increasing transformation of W), the level of probability associated to s(.) and W can be  
different.   
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  Each agent maximizes his/her payoff, i.e. his/her net income given by the 
personal income (Wi with i=1,2) minus the expenditures in rent seeking (si with i=1,2) 
plus the rent (X), if obtained. 
  Given the risk neutrality hypothesis, the individual participation constraint to 
the rent seeking competition is such that the expected payoff is greater or equal to the 
initial income: 
 
      (Wi + X - si) P[ f
-1(si)] + (Wi - si ) {1 - P[ f
-1(si)]}    for i=1, 2              (3)  ≥Wi
 
  With simple calculations, the (3) can be rewritten as: 
              [ ] ) s ( f XP s i
1
i
− ≤    for i= 1, 2           (3’) 
 
  The condition (3’) represents the set of the possible strategies for each agent. 
The individual outlays in rent seeking are smaller or equal to the expected rent
8. The 
agent 1 solves the following maximization problem (the identical problem is solved by 
the agent 2 changing the subscripts): 
 
     ma  E(U x
s1
1) = (W1 + X - s1) P[ f
-1(s1)] + (W1 - s1 ) {1 - P[ f
-1(s1)]}               (4)   
 
  With simple manipulations, we can write: ma  E(U x
s1
1) = X P[ f
-1(s1)] +W1 -s1 
The first order condition is: 
1
1
ds
) dE(U
 = X p(f
-1(s1))⋅(f (s ))
1
1
− ′ - 1 = 0. Since s1= f(W1) 
and  W1= f
-1 (s1), we have that  ′ f = 
1
1
dW
ds
  and  (f )
1 − ′= 
1
1
ds
dW
= 
1
f′
, the first order 
condition becomes: 
 
    
1
1
ds
) dE(U
 = -1+ X p(W1)⋅ 
1
f′
 = 0           (5) 
or 
                    Xp(W1) =  f'             (5’) 
 
Integrating previous expression, we have the expenditure function of the agent 1: 
 
                f (W1) = XP(W1)              (6) 
where 
P(W1) is the winning probability of the agent 1 and represents the probability that the 
opponent competitor has a smaller income. 
 
  The expenditure function for the agent 2 is: 
 
     f   ( W 2) = XP(W2)           (6’) 
                                                 
8 Following the traditional framework of the public choice models, we assume that the agent is not budget 
constrained or, in other words, that the agent can borrow.  
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where 
P(W2) is the winning probability of the agent 2. 
 
  Like all the rent seeking models with risk neutral agents, each agent invests in 
rent seeking activities an amount of resources equal to the expected value of the rent.  
  This is not surprising and crucially derives from the risk neutrality of the 
agents. Nevertheless, in most of the models considering symmetrical agents, the 
winning probability is 
n
1
 with n= 1,2,....n and each agent competes for an expected 
rent equal to 
n
1
 X. In the considered case, the expected value of the rent is not the 
same for the two agents, because they have a different winning probability depending 
from their income.   So for the agent 1, given his/her income of W1, the winning 
probability is the probability that the unknown variable W2 is less than W1. The 
symmetrical reasoning applies to the agent 2. Obviously, the agent with a greater 
income invests a greater amount of resources in rent seeking activities. 
 
5. THE SOCIAL COSTS OF THE RENT SEEKING 
 
  Following the literature, we define the social costs (SC) of the rent seeking 
activities the total amount of resources invested in unproductive lobbying activities and 
so, subtracted from productive activities. 
In this case: 
 
SC= s1 + s2 = f(W1) + f(W2) = XP(W1) + XP(W2) 
 
  There is a total dissipation of the rent if the total amount of resources invested 
are equal to the value of the rent, that is: 
 
XP(W1) + XP(W2) = X  
  The previous expression can written as 
   
             P(W1) + P(W2) = 1 
9             (7) 
or  
P(W1) + P(W2) =P(W) 
  With identical agents (W1 = W2 = W), the “(6)” is 2P(W)=1 or P(W) = 
2
1
. 
Therefore, a total dissipation of the rent results when both agents are median agents, 
                                                 
9 The “(6)” can be written as P(W1) = 1-P(W2).  Note that P(W1) is the probability that W2 < W1  for the 
agent 1 and P(W2) is the probability that W1 < W2 for the agent 2. Then, 1- P(W2) is the probability that 
W2 < W1. Nevertheless, P(W1) is not necessarily equal to 1- P(W2) because W1  and W2 are private 
information and so, P(W1) and P(W2) are probability valuated by the agents 1 and 2 given one’s own 
income. Then, a total dissipation of the rent results only if the valuated probability P(W1) and 1- P(W2) are 
equal. On the contrary, it is possible an underdissipation or an overdissipation as summarized by the 
expressions “(7)” and “(8)”.  
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i.e. they have the median income. With asymmetrical agents (W1  ≠ W 2) a total 
dissipation of the rent can result even if the variation between the two incomes is high. 
This point is summarized in the following claim: 
  Claim 1 
  If the agents rent seekers are characterized by a different income, the rent 
seeking activity implies a total dissipation of the rent if the sum of the cumulative 
probability associated to their incomes is equal to one. 
  At the same way we have an underdissipation and an overdissipation of the 
rent if: 
 
                P(W1) + P(W2) < 1            (8) 
 
                P(W1) + P(W2) > 1            (9) 
 
  Intuitively, claim 1 says that when both the agents have an income smaller or 
greater than the median income, conditions (8) and (9) are respectively satisfied 
confirming the underdissipation and the overdissipation of the rent. When the agents 
rent seekers are in opposite position with respect to the median income, the social costs 
of the rent seeking crucially depend on the income distribution of the rent seekers 
agents
10. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS  
 
  This paper analyzes a rent seeking competition with risk neutral agents having 
a different income whose distribution is known. The expenditure functions are 
increasing with respect to the income. In this framework, the analysis shows that the 
social costs of the rent seeking depend on the income distribution. In particular, unlike 
the Hillman and Samet’s result (1987), the rent seeking costs are smaller than the rent 
if the sum of the cumulative probabilities associated to the individual incomes is lesser 
than one.  
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